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Abstract
I present a game-theoretical model to estimate consumption demand, accounting for
intra-household interaction among household members. Although multiple Nash equilib-
ria of consumption decisions may exist in a household, model parameters are pointwise
identified from household-level data for households with only two members. I propose
a semiparametric maximum likelihood estimator and apply it to empirically analyze the
subscription decision for cellular phone service in Taiwan. On average, a consumer’s
probability of subscribing to cellular service rises 35 percentage points when the other
household member chooses to subscribe. This result suggests the existence of intra-
household network effects on cellular phone consumption. The intra-household effect
increases in household income, but decreases in the number of kids and the age difference
in a household.
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1 Introduction
Standard microeconomic theory analyzes consumer behavior based on individual preferences.
When more than one person lives in a household, we need to take into account the intra-
household allocation of resources and consumption externalities among household members.
Consequently, a consumer’s decision depends on other household member’s choices. In this
paper, I use the term intra-household effect to refer to the effect on a consumer’s willingness
to pay caused by the decision of other members in the same household. I propose a game-
theoretical framework to estimate the intra-household effect on the consumption of telephone
service.
There is a rich literature on estimating household demand for telecommunication ser-
vice. Generally, these studies use household-level survey data. Nonetheless, each household
is treated as a single decision-maker in the estimation. Only household heads’ individual
characteristics are included in the demand estimation. This approach implicitly assumes the
demand to be solely determined by household heads. Other members can influence the deci-
sion only indirectly through household-level variables.1 This assumption is unlikely to be true
in reality. Besides, most of these empirical studies on telephone demand focus on landline
phone service. There are relatively few works on the demand for cellular phone service. Iyen-
gar (2004) and Grzybowski and Pereira (2007) estimate the cellular phone service demand
by using data from billing records. No demographic characteristic is observed in Iyengar
(2004)’s data while only very few demographic characteristics are available in Grzybowski
and Pereira (2007)’s work. In contrast, I use a household survey which provides information
on many household demographic variables.2
1Train, McFadden, and Ben-Akiva (1987) and Train, Ben-Akiva, and Atherton (1989) only consider ag-
gregate household income. In the estimation of demand for local telephone service under optional rate plans,
Miravete (2002) includes several household-level characteristics. His empirical analysis only accounts for
household head’s individual characteristics, but not other members’ characteristics. Many previous researches
(Rappoport and Taylor, 1997; Solvason, 1997; Madden and Simpson, 1997; Duffy-Deno, 2001; Rodini, Ward,
and Woroch, 2003; Economides, Seim, and Viard, 2006) use similar approach in estimating telephone demand.
2A different approach, proposed by Bajari, Fox, and Ryan (2007), estimates demand for cellular phone
service by using market share ranks. Their focus is the value of national coverage. Individual demographic
variables are not included in their estimation as well.
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As Browning, Bourguignon, Chaippori, and Lechene (1994) point out, household behavior
depends on intra-household interactions unless we impose some restrictive hypotheses such
as transferable utilities. They propose a collective household model: Household members
bargain with each other to allocate their overall resources. Individual consumption depends
on the allocation. The bargaining power depends on individual characteristics. The resource
allocation must achieve Pareto efficient in the bargaining process. Using data on couples
with no kids, they find that the allocation of expenditure depends on the relative incomes
and relative ages of the couples, rejecting the hypotheses of a single decision-maker in a
household. See Vermeulen (2002) for further discussions on the collective household model.
I consider a model of binary subscription choices. When there is only a single person in
a household, this model reduces to a standard discrete choice model. When more than one
person lives in a household, consumption externalities among the members may affect their
demand. For example, if the husband has a cellular phone, the wife may have a stronger desire
to own a cellular phone as well. There are several possible reasons for positive intra-household
effect. The first one is the direct network effect. Because the husband can be contacted by
phone more frequently, the wife’s demand for cellular phone service increases. The second
reason is the indirect network effect. For instance, since the husband’s knowledge of cellular
phone service from his own consumption reduces the wife’s search cost on her subscription
decision, she is likely to have higher demand. A third explanation is the price effect. When
the price of a cellular-to-cellular phone call is lower than that of a landline-to-cellular phone
call3, the wife can pays less for a call from a cellular phone than one from a landline phone.
Consequently, she may have higher demand for cellular phone service. Similarly, if carriers
offer family plans which lowers the subscription fee for a second cellular phone, there exist
positive intra-household effect on the consumption. On the other hand, intra-household effect
may be negative if a cellular phone is a public good in a household. Then, each household
member wants to be a free-rider and shares the usage of the other person’s cellular phone.
Because intra-household effect can be either positive or negative in theory, finding out its
3This is the case when cellular carriers offers in-network discounts.
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sign for a particular good is an empirical issue. The objective of the paper is to estimate the
sign and the magnitude of intra-household effects for cellular phone service.
In the current paper, I restrict my attention to households with only two members. Each
of the two members makes a binary choice on the subscription of telephone service. My model
is similar to entry models in the industrial organization literature, such as Bresnahan and
Reiss (1990). However, the spillover effects between two firms in an entry model are always
negative. The entrance of one firm reduces the profit of the other firm. Their entry decisions
must be strategic substitutes. For household consumption behavior, the effects may be either
positive or negative. When they are positive, the decisions are strategic complements. I do
not restrict the sign of intra-household effects in the estimation. In addition, the sign can
vary across households. I will investigate how intra-household effects vary across households.
Different from Browning et al. (1994)’s collective household model, the equilibrium allocation
is not necessarily Pareto optimal in my game-theoretical model.
The primary difficulty in the estimation is to deal with multiple Nash equilibria. When
intra-household effect is negative, we can estimate the model by using the equilibrium num-
ber of subscribers in a household, which always has a unique equilibrium, as in Bresnahan
and Reiss (1990)’s entry model. On the contrary, when intra-household effect is positive, this
approach does not work because the equilibrium number of subscribers may have multiple
Nash equilibria as well. Because there is no one-to-one mapping between model primitives
and outcomes in the presence of multiple equilibria, model parameters can only be partially
identified in general. To explicitly deal with multiple Nash equilibria, one approach is to
consider the selection rule among these equilibria. For example, Jia (2007) imposes an ad
hoc selection rule to choose among multiple market equilibria. Bajari, Hong, and Ryan
(2007) propose a simulation-based method to estimate the selection rule. Another approach
uses bounds estimation based on inequality constraints derived from necessary conditions for
pure strategy Nash equilibria (Chernozhukov, Hong, and Tamer, 2007; Ciliberto and Tamer,
2007; Pakes, Porter, Ho, and Ishii, 2006). Nonetheless, for a two-by-two game, Tamer (2003)
shows that point identification can be achieved under a suitable exclusion condition. He
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proposes a two-step estimation procedure. In the first step, use nonparametric estimation
to determine the selection among multiple equilibria. Model parameters are obtained by a
maximum likelihood estimation in the second step. In Tamer’s paper, however, the interac-
tion effect between the two agents is assumed to be constant, independent of any observed
characteristic. In this paper, I generalize Tamer’s model and allow the interaction effect to be
heterogeneous, depending on observed household characteristics. I show that the parameters
in this generalized demand model can still be pointwise identified.
I apply the econometric approach to study the demand for cellular phone service in
Taiwan. The estimated marginal intra-household effect of cellular phone service increases a
consumer’s probability of subscription by 35.24 percentage points on average. The finding
suggests the existence of network effect within a household. Heterogeneity of the effects
across households can be explained by the observed characteristics. Intra-household effects
increase in household income, but decrease in the number of kids and the age difference in a
household.
Another important contribution of this paper is to estimate the direct effect of both
household-level and individual-level characteristics on telephone demand after controlling for
intra-household effects. Previous researches only include household head’s individual char-
acteristics, but not other member’s individual characteristics, in the estimation. Therefore,
it is difficult to identify the effect of some individual demographic variables such as gender
since most household heads are male. In this paper, I find that males have higher demand
for cellular phone service than females. Moreover, household income by itself has a negative
effect on telephone consumption, but individual income has a positive effect. Because the
latter effect is substantially larger than the former one, the total effect for an increase in a
consumer’s income is positive.
In the next section, I introduce the econometric model and propose my estimation ap-
proach. Section 3 describes the data to be used in the estimation. I then present my empirical
results on the consumption of cellular phone service in Taiwan and demonstrate the estimated
intra-household effects in Section 4. Concludes are given in the final section.
5
2 Econometric Model
The presence of intra-household effect means that consumption depends on the decision of
other household members. In this section, I present a static discrete choice model which is an
extension of the probit model. I restrict my attention to households with two members and
show that the model parameters are fully identified despite the existence of multiple Nash
equilibria in a noncooperative game between the two household members. I then present
a semiparametric maximum likelihood estimator and conduct a Monte Carlo experiment to
demonstrate the performance of the estimator.
2.1 Discrete Choice Model
For household i, there are two members j ∈ {1, 2}. All characteristics of each member are
observed by both members. Household-level characteristics, such as household income, resi-
dence location, . . . , etc., are common to both member, while individual-level characteristics,
such as gender, age, education . . . etc., are not. Furthermore, some characteristics, such as
taste on new technology, are observed only by the two household members, but not by the
econometrician.
A consumer’s subscription decision depends on the direct effect of consumption and the
intra-household effect of consumption. The former effect is determined by the consumer’s own
individual-level characteristics as well as the household-level characteristics in his household.
The latter effect depends on the choice of the other household member. Its magnitude is
normalized to zero when the other member does not subscribe. I assume the intra-household
effect is reciprocal between the two members and its magnitude is determined by household-
level characteristics.
Let the binary variable yij ∈ {0, 1} denote the subscription decision of individual j in
household i. Let yij = 1 if and only if the individual subscribes to the telephone service. The
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demand is characterized by
yij = 1 ⇔ [x
′
ijβ + εij ] + yi(3−j)[z
′
iγ] > 0, (1)
where (3 − j) is the index for the other member in the household. The terms in the first
bracket of equation (1) represents the direct effect of consumption. The term in the second
bracket, z′iγ, captures the magnitude of the intra-household effect. The vector xij is member
j’s observed characteristics (including both household-level and individual-level characteris-
tics) and the scalar εij represents his unobserved characteristics. The vector zi includes all
household-level characteristics which affect the intra-household effect. To identify the model
parameters, at least one of the elements in the vector xij (such as member j’s age) is not a
household-level characteristic. Furthermore, both xij and zi contain a constant term. My
model reduces to the standard probit model if the intra-household effect vanishes (γ = 0). If
the intra-household effect is restricted to be constant across households, as in Tamer (2003)’s
model, the vector zi only contains the constant term (z
′
iγ = γ0).
The unobserved characteristics (εi1, εi2) are assumed to be jointly normally distributed,
independently across households.

εi1
εi2

 ∼ N



0
0

 ,

1 ρ
ρ 1



 . (2)
The variance of εij is normalized to one. The correlation coefficient ρ in (2) is to be estimated.
Finally, let Yi = yi1 + yi2 denote the total number of subscribers in the household.
2.2 Nash Equilibria
Consider a simultaneous-move non-cooperative game.4 This is similar to the incomplete
model discussed in Tamer (2003). Figure 1 shows the set of equilibria for positive intra-
4The set of Nash equilibria under a cooperative game is a subset of Nash equilibria under a non-cooperative
game. Consequently, the results under a cooperative game can be viewed as imposing an equilibrium selection
rule on the results under a non-cooperative game. I will discuss more on this issue in Subsection 2.4.
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(yi1, yi2) = (0, 1)
(yi1, yi2) = (1, 0)(yi1, yi2) = (0, 0)
(yi1, yi2) = (1, 1)
(yi1, yi2) = (0, 0) or
(yi1, yi2) = (1, 1)
εi1
εi2
−x′i1β−x
′
i1β − z
′
iγ
−x′i2β
−x′i2β − z
′
iγ
s s
s
s
Figure 1: Nash equilibria for positive intra-household effects
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household effect (z′iγ > 0) conditional on observed characteristics (xi1,xi2, zi) and unob-
served characteristics (εi1, εi2). There are multiple Nash equilibria when (εi1, εi2) ∈ (−x
′
i1β−
z
′
iγ,−x
′
i1β)× (−x
′
i2β−z
′
iγ,−x
′
i2β). Both (yi1, yi2) = (0, 0) and (yi1, yi2) = (1, 1) are equilib-
ria in this region. Nonetheless, the model predicts the exact probability for (yi1, yi2) = (0, 1)
and (yi1, yi2) = (1, 0). Given the observed characteristics (xi1,xi2, zi), the probability of the
event (yi1, yi2) = (0, 0) is bounded by
Pr
(
{εi1 < −x
′
i1β − z
′
iγ, εi2 < −x
′
i2β} ∪ {εi1 < −x
′
i1β, εi2 < −x
′
i2β − z
′
iγ}|xi1,xi2, zi
)
and
Pr(εi1 < −x
′
i1β, εi2 < −x
′
i2β|xi1,xi2, zi).
On the other hand, when the effect is negative (z′iγ < 0), there are multiple equilibria of
(0, 1) and (1, 0) if (εi1, εi2) ∈ (−x
′
i1β,−x
′
i1β − z
′
iγ) × (−x
′
i2β,−x
′
i2β − z
′
iγ). (See Figure 2.)
The model gives the exact probabilities of (yi1, yi2) = (0, 0) and (yi1, yi2) = (1, 1), but not
(yi1, yi2) = (0, 1) and (yi1, yi2) = (1, 0).
Regardless the sign of intra-household effect, the exact probability of observing one sub-
scriber in a household (Yi = yi1 + yi2 = 1) for given observed characteristics (xi1,xi2, zi) can
summarized as
P1 (xi1,xi2, zi;β,γ, ρ)
≡Pr (Yi = 1|xi1,xi2, zi;β,γ)
=Pr
(
εi1<−x
′
i1β − z
′
iγ, εi2>−x
′
i2β|xi1,xi2, zi
)
+Pr
(
εi1>−x
′
i1β, εi2<−x
′
i2β − z
′
iγ|xi1,xi2, zi
)
− 1{z′iγ<0}Pr
(
−x′i1β<εi1<−x
′
i1β − z
′
iγ,−x
′
i2β<εi2<−x
′
i2β − z
′
iγ|xi1,xi2, zi
)
, (3)
where 1{·} denotes the indicator function. However, the exact probabilities of no subscriber
(Yi = 0) and two subscribers (Yi = 2) in a household are unknown when intra-household effect
is positive because we do not know how individuals choose among multiple Nash equilibria.5
5Contrary to my model, in Bresnahan and Reiss (1990)’s entry model, the effect must be negative. As a
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(yi1, yi2) = (0, 1)
(yi1, yi2) = (1, 0)(yi1, yi2) = (0, 0)
(yi1, yi2) = (1, 1)
(yi1, yi2) = (0, 1) or
(yi1, yi2) = (1, 0)
εi1
εi2
−x′i1β − z
′
iγ−x
′
i1β
−x′i2β − z
′
iγ
−x′i2β
s s
s
s
Figure 2: Nash equilibria for negative intra-household effects
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Without loss of generality, we only need to focus on the probability Pr(Yi = 0|xi1,xi2, zi)
because Pr(Yi = 2|xi1,xi2, zi) can be obtained from 1 − Pr(Yi = 0|xi1,xi2, zi) − Pr(Yi =
1|xi1,xi2, zi). Without imposing any equilibrium selection rule, the probability of no sub-
scriber in a household is bounded in an interval. The upper bound occurs when individuals
always fail to coordinate their decisions in the event of multiple Nash equilibria.
PU0 (xi1,xi2, zi;β,γ, ρ) ≡ Pr(εi1 <−x
′
i1β, εi2 <−x
′
i2β|xi1,xi2, zi). (4)
The lower bound is achieved when individuals can perfectly coordinate.
PL0 (xi1,xi2, zi;β,γ, ρ) ≡ Pr(εi1 < −x
′
i1β, εi2 < −x
′
i2β|xi1,xi2, zi)
− 1{z′iγ>0}Pr(−x
′
i1β − z
′
iγ<εi1<−x
′
i1β,−x
′
i2β − z
′
iγ<εi2<−x
′
i2β|xi1,xi2, zi). (5)
2.3 Identification
Although multiple Nash equilibria are possible, the parameters in the econometric model
are pointwise identified. My model is similar to but more complicated than Tamer (2003).
Tamer’s model is identified when we have data on the individual decisions (yi1, yi2). However,
the data set that I use only reports the aggregate decision in a household (Yi = yi1 + yi2),
not individual choices. Nonetheless, the following theorem shows the parameters are still
identified.
Theorem 1. Suppose that there exists a regressor of individual characteristics (xi1k, xi2k)
with xi1k, xi2k /∈ zi and βk 6= 0 and such that the conditional distribution of xi1k|x−i1k has
an everywhere positive Lebesgue density where x−i1k = (xi11, . . . , xi1,k−1, xi1,k+1, . . . , xi1K)
′.
Then the parameters, (β,γ, ρ), are identified if the matrices X1 ≡ [x11 x21 · · ·xN1], X2 ≡
[x12 x22 · · ·xN2], and Z ≡ [z1 z2 · · · zN ] have full rank.
Proof. In equation (3), I have shown that the exact probabilities of Yi = 1, which is denoted
by P1(xi1,xi2, zi;β,γ, ρ), can be obtained for any given observed characteristics (xi1,xi2, zi).
result, the value of Yi is unique in equilibrium.
11
Without loss of generality, assume βk > 0. Let (β˜, γ˜, ρ˜) be different from (β,γ, ρ). I will
consider four possible cases.
Case 1: β˜ 6= β and β˜k > 0: As xi1k goes to minus infinity for given x−i1k, both xi1kβk and
xi1kβ˜k go to minus infinity. Because X2 has full rank, there exists x
∗
i2 such that x
∗′
i2β 6= x
∗′
i2β˜.
Consequently, as xi1k → −∞,
P1 (xi1,x
∗
i2, zi;β,γ, ρ) ≃ Pr
(
εi2 > −x
∗′
i2β
)
6= Pr
(
εi2 > −x
∗′
i2β˜
)
≃ P1
(
xi1,x
∗
i2, zi; β˜, γ˜, ρ˜
)
.
This implies the parameters (β,γ, ρ) are identified.
Case 2: β˜ 6= β and β˜k < 0: Since Z has full rank, there exists z
∗
i such that z
∗′
i γ 6= z
∗′
i γ˜
when γ˜ 6= γ. If the parameters are not identified, then
P1 (xi1,xi2, z
∗
i ;β,γ, ρ) ≃ Pr(εi2 > −x
′
i2β)
= Pr
(
εi2 < −x
′
i2β˜ − z
∗′
i γ˜
)
≃ P1
(
xi1,xi2, z
∗
i ; β˜, γ˜, ρ˜
)
. (6)
for any xi2 as xi1k → −∞ for given x−i1k, and
P1 (xi1,xi2, z
∗
i ;β,γ, ρ) ≃ Pr
(
εi2 < −x
′
i2β − z
∗′
i γ
)
= Pr
(
εi2 > −x
′
i2β˜
)
≃ P1
(
xi1,xi2, z
∗
i ; β˜, γ˜, ρ˜
)
. (7)
for any xi2 as xi1k → +∞ for given x−i1k. Since εi2 is a symmetric distribution with zero
mean, Equations (6) and (7) together imply
x
′
i2β = −x
′
i2β˜ − z
∗′
i γ˜ = x
′
i2β + z
∗′
i γ − z
∗′
i γ˜ 6= x
′
i2β.
This is a contradiction. Therefore, equations (6) and (7) cannot hold together, implying the
parameters (β,γ, ρ) are identified when γ˜ 6= γ.
If γ˜ = γ, either equation (6) or (7) implies that x′i2(β + β˜) + z
∗′
i γ = 0 holds for any
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(xi2, zi). This contradicts with the fact that X2 and Z both have full rank.
Case 3: β˜ = β but γ˜ 6= γ: Because βk > 0, I know β˜k > 0. Let xi1k go to positive infinity.
Both xi1kβk and xi1kβ˜k go to positive infinity. Because Z has full rank, there exists z
∗∗
i such
that z∗∗′i γ 6= z
∗∗′
i γ˜. As x−i1k → +∞, for any xi2, I have
P1 (xi1,xi2, z
∗∗
i ;β,γ, ρ) ≃ Pr
(
εi2 < −x
′
i2β − z
∗∗′
i γ
)
6= Pr
(
εi2 < −x
′
i2β˜ − z
∗∗′
i γ˜
)
≃ P1
(
xi1,xi2, z
∗∗
i ; β˜, γ˜, ρ
)
.
Therefore, I can identify the parameters.
Case 4: (β˜, γ˜) = (β,γ) but ρ˜ 6= ρ: For z′iγ > 0, I have
∂P1(xi1,xi2, zi;β,γ, ρ)
∂ρ
= −
e
−
(x′i1β+z
′
iγ)
2+(x′i2β)
2
−2ρ(x′i1β+z
′
iγ)(x
′
i2β)
2(1−ρ2)
pi
√
1− ρ2
< 0.
Similarly, for z′iγ < 0, I can obtain
∂P1(xi1,xi2, zi;β,γ, ρ)
∂ρ
=
−
e
−
(x′i1β)
2+(x′i2β)
2
−2ρ(x′i1β)(x
′
i2β)
2(1−ρ2)
2pi
√
1− ρ2
−
e
−
(x′i1β+z
′
iγ)
2+(x′i2β+z
′
iγ)
2
−2ρ(x′i1β+z
′
iγ)(x
′
i2β+z
′
iγ)
2(1−ρ2)
2pi
√
1− ρ2
< 0.
Therefore, ρ can be identified from the data.
Note that identification of the coefficients (β,γ) only depends on the marginal distribution
of the idiosyncratic preferences (εi1, εi2), not on their joint distribution.
2.4 Semiparametric Maximum Likelihood Estimator
If intra-household effect is negative, I know the exact probability of the events {Yi = 0},
{Yi = 1}, and {Yi = 2} conditional on the observed characteristics (xi1,xi2, zi). Consequently,
the usual likelihood can be computed. On the contrary, the exact probabilities of {Yi = 0}
and {Yi = 2} are unknown when the effect is positive. I use a semiparametric maximum
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likelihood estimator, extended from Tamer (2003)’s approach, to obtain the parameters in
the demand model. Specifically, the estimation consists of two steps. In the first step, I use a
kernel regression to obtain the empirical probability of {Yi = 0}. In the second step, I replace
the unknown probabilities in the likelihood function by the empirical probabilities obtained
in the first step and maximize the likelihood to obtain the parameter estimates.
Define the conditional probability of the event {Yi = 0} for observed characteristics
(xi1,xi2, zi) as
H(xi1,xi2, zi) = Pr (Yi = 0|xi1,xi2, zi) .
When the function H is known, I can write down the likelihood, and the parameters (β,γ, ρ)
are estimated by maximizing the logarithm of the likelihood function. For a random sample
with size N ,6 the logarithm of the likelihood function is
L(β,γ, ρ;H) =
1
N
∑
i
{
1[Yi = 0] log(H(xi1,xi2, zi))
+1[Yi = 1] log (P1 (xi1,xi2, zi;β,γ, ρ))
+1[Yi = 2] log
(
1−H(xi1,xi2, zi)− P1 (xi1,xi2, zi;β,γ, ρ)
)}
(8)
The unknown functionH(xi1,xi2, zi) represents the probability of observing no subscriber
in a household. From equations (4) and (5), we know that H(xi1,xi2, zi) is bounded by the
closed interval [PL0 (xi1,xi2, zi;β,γ, ρ), P
U
0 (xi1,xi2, zi;β,γ, ρ)] when multiple Nash equilibria
exist, but the model cannot predict the exact probability. I follow Tamer (2003)’s sugges-
tion to approximate the unknown function by a kernel regression of the event {Yi = 0} on
the observed characteristics (xi1,xi2, zi).
7 Since the function H(xi1,xi2, zi) is bounded by
[PL0 (xi1,xi2, zi;β,γ, ρ), P
U
0 (xi1,xi2, zi;β,γ, ρ)], I truncate the result of the kernel regression
6The survey data I use to perform estimation is not a random sample. Therefore, I need to adjust for the
sampling weights in my calculation. To ease the exposition, however, I present the estimator without writing
down the sampling weights.
7Any function which locally approximates the true probability of {Yi = 0} can be used in the estimation.
In the current paper, I use Gaussian kernel regression to estimate H(xi1,xi2, zi).
Hˆ(xi1,xi2, zi) =
1
N
P
i′
1[Yi′ = 0]φ
 
1
B
d[(xi1,xi2, zi), (xi′1, xi′2, zi)]

1
N
P
i′ φ
 
1
B
d[(xi1,xi2, zi), (xi′1, xi′2, zi)]
 ,
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by the upper and lower bounds and denote the value as Hˆ(xi1,xi2, zi;β,γ, ρ). Replace H
in the likelihood (8) by Hˆ. I can obtain a consistent estimate of (β,γ, ρ). To obtain the
variance of the estimator, I need to account for the standard errors resulting from the ker-
nel regression in the first step. Instead of computing the analytic variance, I compute the
variance by bootstrapping.
Estimating the model under the assumption of a simultaneous-move non-cooperative game
seems restrictive, but it is actually not. When the interaction within a household is not a
simultaneous-move non-cooperative game, the proposed estimator is still consistent, though
it is less efficient. If all households can perfectly coordinate their consumption decisions as
in a simultaneous-move cooperative game, the kernel estimator of H(xi1,xi2, zi) in the first
step will converge to PL0 (xi1,xi2, zi) in probability. My proposed estimator remains valid
for this situation. Similarly, if individuals make decisions sequentially rather than simulta-
neously, then the unique subgame-prefect equilibrium is also a subset of the Nash equilibria
under a simultaneous-move non-cooperative game. The kernel estimator of H(xi1,xi2, zi) will
also converge to the exact probability of no subscriber in the subgame-perfect equilibrium.
Consequently, my estimation approach can also apply to this case.
2.5 Monte Carlo
To demonstrate the performance of my estimator, I conduct a Monte Carlo experiment using
the discrete choice model described in (1). For each individual, there are three observed
characteristics (xij1, xij2, zi). The first two variables have direct effect on the subscription
decision, while the final one affects the intra-household effect. In addition, assume xi11 = xi21,
that is, this variable is common to both household members. The choice model of (1) can be
where φ is the density function of a standard normal distribution, and the metric d is defined as
d[(xi1,xi2, zi), (xi′1, xi′2, zi′)] ≡
v
u
u
t
1
2K + L
"
2
X
j=1
K
X
k=1
(xijk − xi′jk)2
V ar(x·jk)
+
L
X
l=1
(zil − zi′l)2
V ar(z·l)
#
.
A bandwidth B = 0.3 is used for the following results. The parameter estimates are robust to changes in the
bandwidth B.
15
Table 1: Monte Carlo Results
True Standard
Parameter Value Mean Median Deviation MSE
β0 -1.0 -1.006 -0.999 0.073 0.005
β1 2.5 2.605 2.580 0.207 0.054
β2 1.5 1.551 1.535 0.116 0.016
γ0 1.0 0.955 0.962 0.151 0.024
γ1 1.5 1.500 1.510 0.120 0.014
ρ -0.5 -0.535 -0.543 0.177 0.074
Notes: The Monte Carlo simulation is conducted for 100 samples.
Each sample consists of 1000 households.
expresses as
yij = 1 ⇔ [β0 + β1xij1 + β2xij2 + εij ] + yi(3−j)[γ0 + γ1zi] > 0. (9)
All the observed characteristics are generated from the standard normal distribution N(0, 1)
independently. The unobserved characteristics (εi1, εi2) are drawn from a joint normal dis-
tribution with unit variance and correlation coefficient ρ.
I generate 100 samples of size 1000 to assess the property of my proposed estimator. True
parameters are β0 = −1.0, β1 = 2.5, β2 = 1.5, γ0 = 1.0, γ1 = 1.5, and ρ = −0.5. When
multiple Nash equilibria (i.e. both Yi = 0 and Yi = 2 are equilibria.) exist, I assume that the
event Yi = 2 occurs randomly with probability 0.7. The results are shown in Table 1. All the
parameters can be estimated reasonably well. The estimator for the correlation of unobserved
characteristics (ρ) has the largest mean squared error. In addition, this value is identified
only through the functional form assumption, not directly from the data. Therefore, in my
empirical study, I will have more confidence on the estimator of the coefficients β and γ, and
not make any inference about the estimated correlation ρ.
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3 Data
The data come form the 2003 Survey of Family Income and Expenditure in Taiwan. This
survey was conducted by the Directorate-General of Budget, Accounting and Statistics in
early 2004. It adopts a stratified two-stage sampling method with counties and cities as
subpopulations. The universal sampling rate is 0.20%, which is 13,681 households. Because
young kids are unlikely to make their own decisions and they are unlikely to use telephones,
young kids are not counted as household members in my empirical work. I define young
kids as people who are less than 6 years old. The estimation results do not change much
for different definition of young kids. Based on this age criterion, there are 3,489 households
with two members.
Descriptive statistics are presented in Table 2. The first two columns are means and
standard deviations for the subsample with two household members. The final two columns
are for the entire sample in the survey. The upper panel shows the household-level variables,
while the lower panel presents individual-level variables. I construct three household-level
variables (age difference, education difference, and income difference) from the original data
by computing the difference of individual-level variables in each two-member household. In-
comes are measured in Taiwan dollars (TWD). The average exchange rate between US dollars
and Taiwan dollars in 2003 is 1 USD = 34.42 TWD. Note that household income is more than
twice of individual income in the subsample because part of the household income cannot be
attributed to either member. The mean of age in the subsample is considerably older than
that in the entire population. This is reasonable because families with one or more teenagers
living together with their parents are excluded in the subsample. Households in the subsam-
ple also tends to have lower total income because their sizes are smaller on average. Besides,
households in the subsample are modestly more likely to live in the South region.8
I only observe the total numbers of cellular phones in a household. Table 3 summarizes
8As defined by the Directorate General of Telecommunications, the counties and cities included in each
of the three regions are the following. (1) North: Keelung, Taipei, Taoyuan, Hsinchu, Yilan, Hualien, and
Lienchiang; (2) Central: Miaoli, Taichung, Changhua, Nantou, and Yunlin; (3) South: Chiayi , Tainan,
Kaohsiung, Pingtung, Taitung, Penghu, and Kinmen.
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics
Subsample Entire Sample
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Description
Household-level Variables
Cellular Phone 1.071 0.876 1.859 1.324 Number of cell phones
Household Income 0.789 0.603 1.065 0.740 Annual income (106 TWD)
City 0.793 0.405 0.807 0.395 Living in a city
Town 0.168 0.374 0.163 0.369 Living in a town
Rural 0.039 0.193 0.030 0.171 Living in rural area
North 0.444 0.497 0.472 0.499 Living in North region
Central 0.223 0.416 0.228 0.419 Living in Cental region
South 0.333 0.471 0.300 0.458 Living in South region
Number of Kids 0.270 0.597 0.217 0.530 Number of young kids
Household Size 2.000 0.000 3.310 1.490 Number of HH members
Age Difference 0.107 0.122 Age difference
Education Differ. 0.305 0.330 Education difference (10 yr)
Income Difference 0.502 0.483 Individual income difference
Individual-level Variables
Gender 0.511 0.500 0.501 0.500 Female = 1
Age 0.523 0.185 0.387 0.202 Age (100 years)
Education 0.884 0.478 0.963 0.424 Years of Education (10 years)
Employment 0.478 0.500 0.466 0.499 Employed = 1
Individual Income 0.368 0.463 0.301 0.449 Annual Income (106 TWD)
sample size 3489 13681
Notes: The sampling weights are used to compute means and standard deviations.
Table 3: Distribution of the Number of Telephones in a Household
Number of
Cellular Phone Percentage
0 30.57
1 35.32
2 31.32
3 2.02
4 0.73
5 0.05
Notes: Percentages are computed
according to the sampling weights.
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the distributions of the number of telephones among households with two members. When
the total is zero, obviously neither member subscribes to the phone service. When it is one,
only one member in the household choose to subscribe, and the other member does not.
When there is more than one phone, I assume that both individuals choose to have one. In
my data, 3% of two-member households own more than two cellular phones.
4 Empirical Results
In this section, I apply the estimation method introduced in Section 2 to analyze the demand
for cellular phone service in Taiwan. The parameter estimates for the coefficients in (1) are
presented in Table 4.
First, in Column (A), intra-household effects are restricted to be zero. The model is
identical to the standard probit model except that unobserved characteristics εij are allowed
to be correlated within a household. The estimated coefficients for household income and
individual income are both significantly positive, suggesting cellular phone service is a normal
good. Moreover, age has a negative effect on demand while education and employment have
positive effects.
In Column (B), I include intra-household effect in the choice model but assume the effect
to be a constant γ0 across households. The marginal intra-household effect is 28.4 percentage
points, which is significantly positive. Therefore, I can reject the hypothesis γ0 = 0.
9 This
result suggests the subscription decisions are strategically complements within a household.
There exists within-household networks effect on the consumption of cellular phone service.
The estimate for the coefficient of household income remains positive, but its magnitude is
much smaller than that in Column (A) once I control for the intra-household effect.
In the final two columns of Table 4, I allow for the heterogeneity of intra-household ef-
fect. The effect is captured by z′iγ. In Column (C), I include all observed household-level
characteristics into the vector zi. In addition to the household-level variables shown in Table
9Alternatively, the hypothesis can also be rejected by a likelihood-ratio test. The likelihood in Column (B)
is significantly larger than the likelihood in Column (A).
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Table 4: Estimation Results
(A) (B) (C) (D)
Characteristics β β γ β γ β γ
constant 0.240 -0.485∗∗∗ 0.952∗∗∗ -0.425∗∗∗ 1.140∗∗∗ -0.465∗∗∗ 1.188∗∗∗
(0.160) (0.112) (0.056) (0.151) (0.200) (0.124) (0.179)
[0.289]
Household Income 0.304∗∗∗ 0.087∗ -0.546∗∗∗ 0.589∗∗∗ -0.544∗∗∗ 0.627∗∗∗
(0.083) (0.047) (0.134) (0.114) (0.119) (0.124)
[0.077] [0.025] [-0.156] [0.163] [-0.156] [0.173]
Town -0.129∗∗∗ -0.077∗ -0.007 -0.135 -0.139∗
(0.047) (0.046) (0.047) (0.089) (0.076)
[-0.033] [-0.022] [-0.002] [-0.038] [-0.039]
Rural -0.139 0.076 0.069 0.047 0.104
(0.103) (0.081) (0.105) (0.156) (0.126)
[-0.035] [0.022] [0.020] [0.013] [0.028]
Central -0.003 0.078 0.099 -0.050 0.058
(0.045) (0.056) (0.068) (0.073) (0.055)
[-0.001] [0.023] [0.029] [-0.014] [0.017]
South -0.083∗ -0.018 -0.022 0.002 -0.019
(0.046) (0.046) (0.049) (0.064) (0.043)
[-0.021] [-0.005] [-0.006] [0.001] [-0.006]
Number of Kids -0.029 -0.021 0.047 -0.173∗∗∗ -0.123∗∗∗
(0.041) (0.032) (0.057) (0.062) (0.041)
[-0.007] [-0.006] [0.013] [-0.048] [-0.034]
Average Age -0.428 -0.472∗
(0.267) (0.257)
[-0.118] [-0.130]
Average Education 0.044
(0.097)
[0.012]
Average Employment -0.128 -0.188∗∗
(0.101) (0.092)
[-0.035] [-0.052]
Age Difference -1.013∗∗∗ -1.054∗∗∗
(0.271) (0.288)
[-0.280] [-0.290]
Education Difference 0.081 0.112
(0.075) (0.069)
[0.022] [0.031]
Income Difference 0.036
(0.150)
[0.010]
Gender 0.007 -0.124∗ -0.120∗ -0.128∗
(0.081) (0.064) (0.068) (0.067)
[0.002] [-0.036] [-0.035] [-0.037]
Age -2.677∗∗∗ -1.588∗∗∗ -1.364∗∗∗ -1.312∗∗∗
(0.156) (0.148) (0.153) (0.126)
[-0.677] [-0.461] [-0.391] [-0.378]
Education 0.742∗∗∗ 0.598∗∗∗ 0.549∗∗∗ 0.601∗∗∗
(0.064) (0.084) (0.090) (0.082)
[0.188] [0.174] [0.157] [0.173]
Employment 0.419∗∗∗ 0.284∗∗∗ 0.246∗∗∗ 0.284∗∗∗
(0.068) (0.063) (0.068) (0.060)
[0.114] [0.086] [0.073] [0.085]
Individual Income 0.617∗∗∗ 0.617∗∗∗ 1.134∗∗∗ 1.080∗∗∗
(0.179) (0.161) (0.223) (0.178)
[0.156] [0.179] [0.325] [0.311]
ρ 0.014 -0.841∗∗∗ -0.908∗∗∗ -0.899∗∗∗
(0.039) (0.030) (0.019) (0.021)
Likelihood -2548.813 -2520.171 -2483.426 -2488.481
Notes: Standard errors, computed from 50 bootstrap draws, are in parentheses. Marginal effects, computed as
average derivatives of the subscription probability except for for dummy variables whose effects are evaluated
for a move from 0 to 1, are in square brackets. Superscripts ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗represent significance at 1%, 5%, and
10%, respectively. The sample size is 3489 households.
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2, I construct three additional household-level characteristics by averaging individual-level
variables within a household: average age, average education years, and average employment
status. The last specification, Column (D), removes the characteristics which are not sig-
nificantly different from zero in (C). According to likelihood-ratio tests, there are significant
improvements in the likelihood from Column (B) to (C), but no significant difference between
(C) and (D) at the 5% significance level. Consequently, I select Column (D) as the preferred
specification.
The magnitude of intra-household effect in a household can be expressed as the marginal
effect of one member’s subscription decision on the other member. Specifically, the marginal
intra-household effect is the change in the subscription probability for given observed char-
acteristics when the other member change his decision. For member j in household i, it can
be expressed as
Pr
(
[x′ijβ + εij ] + [z
′
iγ] > 0|xij , zi
)
− Pr
(
[x′ijβ + εij ] > 0|xij , zi
)
.
Based on the parameters βˆ and γˆ estimated in Column (D), I compute the marginal intra-
household effect for each individual. Figure 3 shows the estimated distribution. All of
the estimated effects are positive. On average, the effect increases subscription by 35.24
percentage points, with a standard deviation of 10.50 percentage points. This is a substantial
effect when comparing with the average subscription rate 51.77%. When one household
member chooses to subscribe, its average effect on the other member is equivalent to the effect
caused by increasing the other member’s own individual annual income by 2.283 million TWD
(equal to 66,326 USD) and holding the first household member’s income fixed. The existence
of positive intra-household effects suggests the existence of network effects of cellular phone
service within a household.
As Figure 3 illustrates, intra-household effects vary a lot across households. Estimate
of the vector-valued parameter γ differs significantly from zero at 5% level for several vari-
ables, providing explanations for the heterogeneity. The impact of household income on
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Figure 3: Histogram of the estimated marginal intra-household effects
intra-household effects is both statistically and economically significant. Increasing house-
hold income by one standard deviation (i.e. 603 thousand TWD) raises the marginal intra-
household effect by 10.4 percentage points. This is probably because households with higher
income tend to work longer and spend less time together. Unfortunately, I do not have data
on working hours to verify this conjecture. Households in cities have larger marginal intra-
household effect than those in towns by 3.9 percentage points. The number of kids has a
negative effect, probably because families with more kids tend to spend more time together
and hence reduce the network effect of cellular phone service. Each additional kid reduces the
marginal intra-household effect by 3.4 percentage points. Interestingly, similar to the findings
in Browning et al. (1994), intra-household effects are affected by the difference of individual
characteristics within a household. Age difference reduces the intra-household effect. For in-
stance, at the mean age difference (i.e. 10.7 years), marginal intra-household effect is smaller
than a household with identical-age members by 3.0 percentage points. Within-household
network effect of cellular phone consumption decreases in the relative age. On the contrary,
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Table 5: Cellular Phone Ownership by Region
North Central South
Cellular Phone per Household 2.0422 1.7941 1.6212
Cellular Phone per Person 0.5739 0.4892 0.4806
Table 6: Cellular Phone Ownership by Urbanization Level
City Town Rural Area
Cellular Phone per Household 1.9522 1.5314 1.1450
Cellular Phone per Person 0.5557 0.4198 0.3489
there is no significant difference across the three regions: North, Central, and South. Income
difference within a household only has a small and insignificant effect.
Contrary to most previous researches on telecommunication demand, I can estimate the
direct effect (β) of both household-level and individual-level characteristics. Different from
the findings in Column (A), where intra-household effect is abstracted away, the demand
increases in individual income but decreases in household income when I account for the
intra-household effects in Column (D). The magnitude of the former effect (31.1%) is almost
twice the magnitude of the latter one (15.6%). Consequently, the overall effect of raising a
consumer’s income is positive. For instance, raising a consumer’s income by one standard
deviation (i.e. 463 thousand TWD) increases his own demand by 7.16 percentage points.
Nonetheless, the finding is in contrast with several previous studies on the demand for landline
phone service.10
As for the geographic variables, there is no significant difference in the direct effect across
regions and across urbanization levels. Table 5 and Table 6 show the penetration rate of
cellular service across regions and across urbanization levels. Although the penetration rates
are higher in the North region and in cities, the demand for cellular phone service does
10For example, Miravete (2002) finds household income has negative effects on landline phone service in two
cities in Kentucky in 1986. Economides et al. (2006) also find a negative effect of income on the demand in
New York State in the period 1999 – 2003.
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not have a systematic relationship with the penetration rates. Consequently, there is no
evidence showing the existence of network effects resulting from geographic neighborhoods.
Furthermore, while there are four cellular phone carriers operating in the North region, there
are five carriers operating in the Central and the South regions. More carriers in the Central
and South regions provide more varieties to consumers. However, varieties of cellular phone
service do not have significant effect on the demand.11
Lastly, the direct effects on demand resulting from individual characteristics are consistent
with intuition. The demand is stronger for young, better-educated, and employed people.
Females have weaker demand than males though the difference is significant only at the 10%
level. The estimation result is probably caused by the fact that young and better-educated
people are more familiar with new technology. Employed people usually spend more time
away from home, so they are likely to have higher demand.
5 Conclusion
I empirically analyze intra-household effects on the demand for cellular phone service under
a game-theoretical framework. Because of the interaction between household members, it
is possible to have multiple Nash equilibria in a non-cooperative simultaneous-move game.
Nonetheless, the model parameters are fully identified from the household-level data. I use
a semiparametric maximum likelihood estimator to analyze the demand for cellular phone
service in Taiwan. The intra-household effect of cellular phone service is positive on average,
supporting the existence of network effect on cellular phone consumption within a household.
I also analyze how the intra-household effect varies with household characteristics. This effect
increases in household income but decreases in the number of kids and the age difference in a
household. Furthermore, my estimator provide an estimation of the direct effect on telephone
service consumption resulting from observed characteristics, after accounting for the intra-
household effects.
11It is possible that the effects caused by higher penetration rates and fewer varieties in the North region
cancel out. Without more information, I cannot distinguish between these two effects.
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In the current paper, I restrict my attention to household with only two members. An
important extension is to include households with more than two individuals. Contrary to
the two-member case, the exact probability of any observed event is unknown due to multiple
equilibria. The parameters are only partially identified by inequality conditions.
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